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**NOT FINAL**

**CHECKING AND EDITING STILL REQUIRED**

### **Summary for Policymakers**

The Third Assessment Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) builds upon past assessments and incorporates new results from the past five years of research on climate change (Footnote 1). Many hundreds of scientists (Footnote 2) from many countries participated in its preparation and review.

This Summary for Policymakers (SPM), which was approved by IPCC member governments in Shanghai in January 2001 (Footnote 3), describes the current state of understanding of the climate system and provides estimates of its projected future evolution and their uncertainties. Further details can be found in the underlying report (Source Notes will provide cross references to the report's chapters).

Footnote (1): *Climate change* in IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, where *climate change* refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.

Footnote (2): In total 123 Co-ordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors, 516 Contributing Authors, 21 Review Editors and 300 Expert Reviewers (exact numbers to be inserted).

Footnote (3): Delegations of 100 (exact number to be inserted) IPCC member countries participated in the Eighth Session of Working Group I in Shanghai on 17-20 January 2001.

#### **An increasing body of observations gives a collective picture of a warming world and other changes in the climate system.**

Since the release of the Second Assessment Report, additional data from new studies of current and palaeoclimates, improved analysis of data sets, more rigorous evaluation of their quality, and comparisons among data from different sources have led to greater understanding of climate change.

***The global-average surface temperature has increased over the 20th century by about 0.6 °C.***

- The global-average surface temperature (the average of near surface air temperature over land, and sea surface temperature) has increased since 1861. Over the 20th century the increase has been  $0.6 \pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$  (Footnotes 4,5) (Figure 1a). This value is about  $0.15^\circ\text{C}$  larger than that estimated by the SAR (Footnote 6) for the period up to 1994, owing to the relatively high temperatures of the additional years (1995 to 2000) and improved methods of processing the data. These numbers take into account various adjustments, including urban heat island effects. The record shows a great deal of variability; for example, most of the warming occurred during the 20th century, during two periods, 1910 to 1945 and 1976 to 2000.

Footnote (4): Generally temperature trends are rounded to the nearest  $0.05^\circ\text{C}$  per unit time, the periods often being limited by data availability.

Footnote (5): In general, a 5% statistical significance level is used, and a 95% confidence level.

Footnote (6): The IPCC Second Assessment Report is referred to in this Summary for Policymakers as the SAR.

- Globally, it is very likely that the 1990s was the warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year in the instrumental record, since 1861 (see Figure 1a).
- New analyses of proxy data for the Northern Hemisphere indicate that the increase in temperature in the 20th century is likely (Footnote 7) to have been the largest of any century during the past 1000 years. It is also likely that, in the Northern Hemisphere, the 1990s was the warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year (Figure 1b). Because less data are available, less is known about annual averages prior to 1000 years before present and for conditions prevailing in most of the Southern Hemisphere prior to 1861.

Footnote (7): In this Summary for Policymakers and in the Technical Summary, the following words have been used where appropriate to indicate judgmental estimates of confidence: *virtually certain* (greater than 99% chance that a result is true); *very likely* (90-99% chance); *likely* (66-90% chance); *medium likelihood* (33-66% chance); *unlikely* (10-33% chance); *very unlikely* (1-10% chance); *exceptionally unlikely* (less than 1% chance). The reader is referred to individual chapters for more details. **(Call out footnote at each usage of any of the terms)**

- On average, between 1950 and 1993, night-time daily minimum air temperatures over land increased by about 0.2°C per decade. This is about twice the rate of increase in day-time daily maximum air temperatures (0.1°C per decade). This has lengthened the freeze-free season in many mid- and high-latitude regions. The increase in sea surface temperature over this period is about half that of the mean land surface air temperature.

[Insert Figure 1]

***Temperatures have risen during the past four decades in the lowest 8 kilometres of the atmosphere.***

- Since the late 1950s (the period of adequate observations from weather balloons), the overall global temperature increases in the lowest 8 kilometres of the atmosphere and in surface temperature have been similar at 0.1°C per decade.
- Since the start of the satellite record in 1979, both satellite and weather balloon measurements show that the global average temperature of the lowest 8 kilometres of the atmosphere has changed by  $+0.05 \pm 0.10^\circ\text{C}$  per decade, but the global average surface temperature has increased significantly by  $+0.15 \pm 0.05^\circ\text{C}$  per decade. The difference in the warming rates is statistically significant. This difference occurs primarily over the tropical and sub-tropical regions.
- The lowest 8 kilometres of the atmosphere and the surface are influenced differently by factors such as stratospheric ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosols, and the El Niño phenomenon. Hence, it is physically plausible to expect that over a short time period (e.g. 20 years) there may be differences in temperature trends. In addition, spatial sampling techniques can also explain some of the differences in trends, but these differences are not fully resolved.

***Snow cover and ice extent have decreased.***

- Satellite data show that there are very likely to have been decreases of about 10% in the extent of snow cover since the late 1960s, and ground-based observations show that there is very likely to have been a reduction of about two weeks in the annual duration of lake- and river-ice cover in the mid- and high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, over the 20th century.
- There has been a widespread retreat of mountain glaciers in non-polar regions during the 20th century.
- Northern Hemisphere spring and summer sea-ice extent has decreased by about 10 to 15% since the 1950s. It is likely that there has been about a 40% decline in Arctic sea-ice thickness during late summer to early autumn in recent decades and a considerably slower decline in winter sea-ice thickness.

***Global average sea level has risen and ocean heat content has increased.***

- Tide-gauge data show that global-average sea level rose between 0.1 and 0.2 metres during the 20th century.
- Global-ocean heat content has increased since the late 1950s, the period for which adequate observations of sub-surface ocean temperatures have been available.

***Changes have also occurred in other important aspects of climate.***

- It is very likely that precipitation has increased by 0.5 to 1% per decade in the 20th century over most mid- and high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere continents, and it is likely that rainfall has increased by 0.2 to 0.3% per decade over the tropical (10°N to 10°S) land areas. Increases in the tropics are not evident over the past few decades. It is also likely that rainfall has decreased over much of the Northern Hemisphere sub-tropical (10°N

to 30°N) land areas during the 20th century by about 0.3% per decade. In contrast to the Northern Hemisphere, no comparable systematic changes have been detected in broad latitudinal averages over the Southern Hemisphere. There are insufficient data to establish trends in precipitation over the oceans.

- In the mid- and high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere over the latter half of the 20th century, it is likely that there has been a 2 to 4% increase in the frequency of heavy precipitation events. Increases in heavy precipitation events can arise from a number of causes, e.g., changes in atmospheric moisture, thunderstorm activity and large-scale storm activity.
- It is likely that there has been a 2% increase in cloud cover over mid- to high-latitude land areas during the 20th century. In most areas the trends relate well to the observed decrease in daily temperature range.
- Since 1950 it is very likely that there has been a reduction in the frequency of extreme low temperatures, with a smaller increase in the frequency of extreme high temperatures.
- Warm episodes of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon (which consistently affects regional variations of precipitation and temperature over much of the tropics, sub-tropics and some mid-latitude areas) have been more frequent, persistent and intense since the mid 1970s, compared with the previous 100 years.
- Over the 20th century (1900-1995), there were relatively small increases in global land areas experiencing severe drought or severe wetness. In many regions, these changes are dominated by interdecadal and multidecadal climate variability, such as the shift in ENSO towards more warm events.
- In some regions, such as parts of Asia and Africa, the frequency and intensity of droughts have been observed to increase in recent decades.

***Some important aspects of climate appear not to have changed.***

- A few areas of the globe have not warmed in recent decades, mainly over some parts of the Southern Hemisphere oceans and parts of Antarctica.
- No significant trends of Antarctic sea-ice extent are apparent since 1978, the period of reliable satellite measurements.
- Changes globally in tropical and extratropical storm intensity and frequency are dominated by interdecadal to multidecadal variations, with no significant trends evident over the 20th century. Conflicting analyses make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about changes in storm activity, especially in the extratropics.
- No systematic changes in the frequency of tornadoes, thunder days, or hail events are evident in the limited areas analysed.

**Emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols due to human activities continue to alter the atmosphere in ways that are expected to affect the climate.**

Changes in climate occur as a result of both internal variability within the climate system and external factors (both natural and anthropogenic). The influence of external factors on climate can be broadly compared using the concept of radiative forcing (Footnote 8). A positive radiative forcing, such as that produced by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, tends to warm the surface. A negative radiative forcing, which can arise from an increase in some types of aerosols (microscopic airborne particles) tends to cool the surface. Natural factors, such as changes in solar output or explosive volcanic activity, can also cause radiative forcing. Characterization of these climate forcing agents and their changes over time, (see Figure 2) is required to understand past climate changes in the context of natural variations and to project what climate changes could lie ahead. Figure 3 shows current estimates of the radiative forcing due to increased concentrations of atmospheric constituents and other mechanisms.

Footnote (8): *Radiative forcing* is a measure of the influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere system, and is an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism. It is expressed in Watts per square meter ( $\text{Wm}^{-2}$ ).

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

***Concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a result of human activities.***

- The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) has increased by 31% since 1750. The present CO<sub>2</sub> concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20 million years. The current rate of increase is unprecedented during at least the past 20,000 years.
- About three-quarters of the anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> to the atmosphere during the past 20 years is due to fossil fuel burning. The rest is predominantly due to land-use change, especially deforestation.
- Currently the ocean and the land together are taking up about half of the anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. On land, the uptake of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> very likely exceeded the release of CO<sub>2</sub> by deforestation during the 1990s.
- The rate of increase of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration has been about 1.5 ppm (Footnote 9) (0.4%) per year over the past two decades. During the 1990s the year to year increase varied from 0.9 ppm (0.2%) to 2.8 ppm (0.8%). A large part of this variability is due to the effect of climate variability (e.g. El Niño events) on CO<sub>2</sub> uptake and release by land and oceans.

Footnote (9): ppm (parts per million) or ppb (parts per billion, 1 billion = 1,000 million) is the ratio of the number of greenhouse gas molecules to the total number of molecules of dry air. For example: 300 ppm means 300 molecules of a greenhouse gas per million molecules of dry air.

- The atmospheric concentration of methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) has increased by 1060 ppb (151%) since 1750 and continues to increase. The present CH<sub>4</sub> concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years. The annual growth in CH<sub>4</sub> concentration slowed and became more variable in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s. Slightly more than half of current CH<sub>4</sub> emissions are anthropogenic (e.g., use of fossil fuels, cattle, rice agriculture and landfills). In addition, carbon monoxide (CO) emissions have recently been identified as a cause of increasing CH<sub>4</sub> concentration.
- The atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) has increased by 46 ppb (17%) since 1750 and continues to increase. The present N<sub>2</sub>O concentration has not been exceeded during at least the past thousand years. About a third of current N<sub>2</sub>O emissions are anthropogenic (e.g., agricultural soils, cattle feed lots and chemical industry).
- Since 1995, the atmospheric concentrations of many of those halocarbon gases that are both ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases (e.g., CFC<sub>13</sub> and CF<sub>2</sub>Cl<sub>2</sub>), are either increasing more slowly or decreasing, both in response to reduced emissions under the regulations of the Montreal Protocol and its Amendments. Their substitute compounds (e.g., CHF<sub>2</sub>Cl and CF<sub>3</sub>CH<sub>2</sub>F) and some other synthetic compounds (e.g., perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>)) are also greenhouse gases, and their concentrations are currently increasing.
- The radiative forcing due to increases of the well-mixed greenhouse gases from 1750 to 2000 is estimated to be 2.43 Wm<sup>-2</sup>: 1.46 Wm<sup>-2</sup> from CO<sub>2</sub>; 0.48 Wm<sup>-2</sup> from CH<sub>4</sub>; 0.34 Wm<sup>-2</sup> from the halocarbons; and 0.15 Wm<sup>-2</sup> from N<sub>2</sub>O. (See Figure 3, where the uncertainties are also illustrated.)
- The observed depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer from 1979 to 2000 is estimated to have caused a negative radiative forcing (−0.15 Wm<sup>-2</sup>). Assuming full compliance with current halocarbon regulations, the positive forcing of the halocarbons will be reduced as will the magnitude of the negative forcing from stratospheric ozone (O<sub>3</sub>) depletion as the ozone layer recovers over the 21st century.
- The total amount of O<sub>3</sub> in the troposphere is estimated to have increased by 36% since 1750, due primarily to anthropogenic emissions of several O<sub>3</sub> forming gases. This corresponds to a positive radiative forcing of 0.35 Wm<sup>-2</sup>. O<sub>3</sub> forcing varies considerably by region and responds much more quickly to changes in emissions than

the long-lived greenhouse gases, such as CO<sub>2</sub>.

[Insert Figure 3 here]

***Anthropogenic aerosols are short lived and mostly produce negative radiative forcing.***

- The major sources of anthropogenic aerosols are fossil fuel and biomass burning. These sources are also linked to degradation of air quality and acid deposition.
- Since the SAR, significant progress has been achieved in better characterising the direct radiative roles of different types of aerosols. Direct radiative forcing is estimated to be  $-0.4 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$  for sulphate,  $-0.2 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$  for biomass burning aerosols,  $-0.1 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$  for fossil fuel organic carbon and  $+0.2 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$  for fossil fuel black carbon aerosols. There is much less confidence in the ability to quantify the total aerosol direct effect, and its evolution over time, than that for the gases listed above. Aerosols also vary considerably by region and respond quickly to changes in emissions.
- In addition to their direct radiative forcing, aerosols also have an indirect radiative forcing through their effects on clouds. There is now more evidence for this indirect effect, which is negative, although of very uncertain magnitude.

***Natural factors have made small contributions to radiative forcing over the past century.***

- The radiative forcing due to changes in solar irradiance for the period since 1750 is estimated to be about  $+0.3 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$ , most of which occurred during the first half of the 20th century. Since the late 1970s, satellite instruments have observed small oscillations due to the 11-year solar cycle. Mechanisms for the amplification of solar effects on climate have been proposed, but currently lack a rigorous theoretical or observational basis.
- Stratospheric aerosols from explosive volcanic eruptions lead to negative forcing, which lasts a few years. Several major eruptions occurred in the periods 1880 to 1920 and 1960 to 1991.
- The combined change in radiative forcing of the two major natural factors (solar variation and volcanic aerosols) is estimated to be negative for the past two and possibly the past four decades.

**Confidence in the ability of models to project future climate has increased.**

Complex physically-based climate models are required to provide detailed estimates of feedbacks and of regional features. Such models cannot yet simulate all aspects of climate (e.g., they still cannot account fully for the observed trend in the surface-troposphere temperature difference since 1979) and there are particular uncertainties associated with clouds and their interaction with radiation and aerosols. Nevertheless, confidence in the ability of these models to provide useful projections of future climate has improved due to their demonstrated performance on a range of space and time scales.

- Understanding of climate processes and their incorporation in climate models have improved, including water vapour, sea-ice dynamics, and ocean heat transport.
- Some recent models produce satisfactory simulations of current climate without the need for non-physical adjustments of heat and water fluxes at the ocean-atmosphere interface used in earlier models.
- Simulations that include estimates of natural and anthropogenic forcing reproduce the observed large-scale changes in surface temperature over the 20th century (Figure 4). However, contributions from some additional processes and forcings may not have been included in the models. Nevertheless, the large-scale consistency between models and observations can be used to provide an independent check on projected warming rates over the next few decades under a given emissions scenario.
- Some aspects of model simulations of ENSO, monsoons and the North Atlantic Oscillation, as well as selected periods of past climate, have improved.

**There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.**

The SAR concluded: "The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate". That report also noted that the anthropogenic signal was still emerging from the background of natural climate variability. Since the SAR, progress has been made in reducing uncertainty, particularly with respect to distinguishing and quantifying the magnitude of responses to different external influences. Although many of the sources of uncertainty identified in the SAR still remain to some degree, new evidence and improved understanding support an updated conclusion.

- There is a longer and more closely scrutinised temperature record and new model estimates of variability. The warming over the past 100 years is very unlikely to be due to internal variability alone, as estimated by current models. Reconstructions of climate data for the past 1,000 years (Figure 1b) also indicate that this warming was unusual and is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin.
- There are new estimates of the climate response to natural and anthropogenic forcing, and new detection techniques have been applied. Detection and attribution studies consistently find evidence for an anthropogenic signal in the climate record of the last 35-50 years.
- Simulations of the response to natural forcings alone (i.e., the response to variability in solar irradiance and volcanic eruptions) do not explain the warming in the second half of the 20th century (see e.g., Figure 4 a). However, they indicate that natural forcings may have contributed to the observed warming in the first half of the 20th century.
- The warming over the last 50 years due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases can be identified despite uncertainties in forcing due to anthropogenic sulphate aerosol and natural factors (volcanoes and solar irradiance). The anthropogenic sulphate aerosol forcing, while uncertain, is negative over this period and therefore cannot explain the warming. Changes in natural forcing during most of this period are also estimated to be negative and are unlikely to explain the warming.
- Detection and attribution studies comparing model simulated changes with the observed record can now take into account uncertainty in the magnitude of modelled response to external forcing, in particular that due to uncertainty in climate sensitivity.
- Most of these studies find that, over the last 50 years, the estimated rate and magnitude of warming due to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases alone are comparable with, or larger than, the observed warming. Furthermore, most model estimates that take into account both greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols are consistent with observations over this period.
- The best agreement between model simulations and observations over the last 140 years has been found when all the above anthropogenic and natural forcing factors are combined, as shown in Figure 4 (c). These results show that the forcings included are sufficient to explain the observed changes, but do not exclude the possibility that other forcings may also have contributed.

[Insert Figure 4 here]

In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.

Furthermore, it is very likely that the 20th century warming has contributed significantly to the observed sea level rise, through thermal expansion of sea water and widespread loss of land ice. Within present uncertainties, observations and models are both consistent with a lack of significant acceleration of sea level rise during the 20th century.

## **Human influences will continue to change atmospheric composition throughout the 21st century.**

Models have been used to make projections of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and hence of future climate, based upon emissions scenarios from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Figure 5). These scenarios were developed to update the IS92 series, which were used in the SAR and are shown for comparison here in some cases.

### *Greenhouse gases*

- Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> due to fossil-fuel burning are virtually certain to be the dominant influence on the trends in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration during the 21st century.
- As the CO<sub>2</sub> concentration of the atmosphere increases, ocean and land will take up a decreasing fraction of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The net effect of land and ocean climate feedbacks as indicated by models is to further increase projected atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations, by reducing both the ocean and land uptake of CO<sub>2</sub>.
- By 2100, carbon cycle models project atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations of 540 to 970 ppm for the illustrative SRES scenarios (90 to 250% above the concentration of 280 ppm in the year 1750), Figure 5 (b). These projections include the land and ocean climate feedbacks. Uncertainties, especially about the magnitude of the climate feedback from the terrestrial biosphere, cause a variation of about -10 to +30% around each scenario. The total range is 490 to 1260 ppm (75 to 350% above the 1750 concentration).
- Changing land use could influence atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. If, hypothetically, all of the carbon released by historical land-use changes could be restored to the terrestrial biosphere over the course of the century (e.g., by reforestation), CO<sub>2</sub> concentration would be reduced by 40 to 70 ppm.
- Model calculations of the concentrations of the non-CO<sub>2</sub> greenhouse gases by 2100 vary considerably across the SRES illustrative scenarios, with CH<sub>4</sub> changing by -190 to +1970 ppb (present concentration 1760 ppb), N<sub>2</sub>O changing by +38 to +144 ppb (present concentration 316 ppb), total tropospheric O<sub>3</sub> changing by -12 to +62%, and a wide range of changes in concentrations of HFCs, PFCs and SF<sub>6</sub>, all relative to 2000. In some scenarios, total tropospheric O<sub>3</sub> would become as important a radiative forcing agent as CH<sub>4</sub> and, over much of the Northern Hemisphere, would threaten the attainment of current air quality targets.
- Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the gases that control their concentration would be necessary to stabilise radiative forcing. For example, for the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas, carbon cycle models indicate that stabilisation of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations at 450, 650 or 1000 ppm would require global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to drop below 1990 levels, within a few decades, about a century, or about two centuries, respectively, and continue to decrease steadily thereafter. Eventually CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would need to decline to a very small fraction of current emissions.

### *Aerosols*

- The SRES scenarios include the possibility of either increases or decreases in anthropogenic aerosols (e.g., sulphate aerosols (Figure 5 (c)), biomass aerosols, black and organic carbon aerosols) depending on the extent of fossil fuel use and policies to abate polluting emissions. In addition, natural aerosols (e.g., sea salt, dust, and emissions leading to the production of sulphate and carbon aerosols) are projected to increase as a result of changes in climate.

### *Radiative forcing over the 21st century*

- For the SRES illustrative scenarios, relative to the year 2000, the global mean radiative forcing due to greenhouse gases continues to increase through the 21st century, with the fraction due to CO<sub>2</sub> projected to increase from slightly more than half to about three quarters. The change in the direct plus indirect aerosol radiative forcing is projected to be smaller in magnitude than that of CO<sub>2</sub>.

## Global average temperature and sea level are projected to rise under all IPCC SRES scenarios.

In order to make projections of future climate, models incorporate past, as well as future emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols. Hence, they include estimates of warming to date and the commitment to future warming from past emissions.

### *Temperature*

- The globally averaged surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C (Figure. 5d) over the period 1990 to 2100. These results are for the full range of 35 SRES scenarios, based on a number of climate models. (Footnotes 10,11)
- Temperature increases are projected to be greater than those in the SAR, which were about 1.0 to 3.5°C based on the six IS92 scenarios. The higher projected temperatures and the wider range are due primarily to the lower projected sulphur dioxide emissions in the SRES scenarios relative to the IS92 scenarios.
- The projected rate of warming is much larger than the observed changes during the 20th century and is very likely to be without precedent during at least the last 10,000 years, based on palaeoclimate data.

Footnote (10): Complex physically based climate models are the main tool for projecting future climate change. In order to explore the full range of scenarios, these are complemented by simple climate models calibrated to yield an equivalent response in temperature and sea level to complex climate models. These projections are obtained using a simple climate model whose climate sensitivity and ocean heat uptake are calibrated to each of 7 complex climate models. The climate sensitivity used in the simple model ranges from 1.7 to 4.2°C which is comparable to the commonly accepted range of 1.5 to 4.5°C.

Footnote (11): This range does not include uncertainties in the modeling of radiative forcing, e.g. aerosol forcing uncertainties. A small carbon-cycle climate feedback is included.

- By 2100, the range in the surface temperature response across the group of climate models run with a given scenario is comparable to the range obtained from a single model run with the different SRES scenarios.
- On timescales of a few decades, the current observed rate of warming can be used to constrain the projected response to a given emissions scenario despite uncertainty in climate sensitivity. This approach suggests that anthropogenic warming is likely to lie in the range of 0.1 to 0.2°C per decade over the next few decades under the IS92a scenario, similar to the corresponding range of projections of the simple model used in Figure 5 (d).
- Based on recent global model simulations, it is very likely that nearly all land areas will warm more rapidly than the global average, particularly those at northern high latitudes in the cold season. Most notable of these is the warming in the northern regions of North America, and northern and central Asia, which exceeds global-mean warming in each model by more than 40%. In contrast, the warming is less than the global-mean change in south and southeast Asia in summer and in southern South America in winter.
- Recent trends for surface temperature to become more El-Niño-like in the tropical Pacific, with the eastern tropical Pacific warming more than the western tropical Pacific, with a corresponding eastward shift of precipitation, are projected to continue in many models.

[Insert Figure 5 here]

### *Precipitation*

- Based on global model simulations and for a wide range of scenarios, global average water vapour concentration and precipitation are projected to increase during the 21st century. By the second half of the 21st century, it is likely that precipitation will have increased over northern mid- to high-latitudes and Antarctica in winter. At low latitudes there are both regional increases and decreases over land areas. Larger year to year variations in precipitation are very likely over most areas where an increase in mean precipitation is projected.

### *Extreme Events*

Table 1 depicts an assessment of confidence in observed changes in extremes of weather and climate during the latter half of the 20th century (left column) and in projected changes during the 21st century (right column)#. This assessment relies on observational and modelling studies, as well as the physical plausibility of future projections across all commonly-used scenarios and is based on expert judgement (see Footnote 7).

**Table 1: Estimates of confidence in observed and projected changes in extreme weather and climate events.**

Confidence in observed changes (latter half of the 20th century)	Changes in Phenomenon	Confidence in projected changes (during the 21st century)
Likely	<b>Higher maximum temperatures and more hot days over nearly all land areas</b>	Very likely
Very likely	<b>Higher minimum temperatures, fewer cold days and frost days over nearly all land areas</b>	Very likely
Very likely	<b>Reduced diurnal temperature range over most land areas</b>	Very likely
Likely, over many areas	<b>Increase of heat index (Footnote 12) over land areas</b>	Very likely, over most areas
Likely, over many Northern Hemisphere mid- to high-latitude land areas	<b>More intense precipitation events*</b>	Very likely, over many areas
Likely, in a few areas	<b>Increased summer continental drying and associated risk of drought</b>	Likely, over most mid-latitude continental interiors. (Lack of consistent projections in other areas)
Not observed in the few analyses available	<b>Increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities**</b>	Likely, over some areas
Insufficient data for assessment	<b>Increase in tropical cyclone mean and peak precipitation intensities**</b>	Likely, over some areas

\* For other areas, there are either insufficient data or conflicting analyses.

\*\* Past and future changes in tropical cyclone location and frequency are uncertain.

# For more details see Chapter 2 (observations) and Chapter 9, 10 (projections).

Footnote (12): Heat index: A combination of temperature and humidity that measures effects on human comfort.

- For some other extreme phenomena, many of which may have important impacts on the environment and society, there is currently insufficient information to assess recent trends, and climate models currently lack the spatial detail required to make confident projections. For example, very small-scale phenomena, such as thunderstorms, tornadoes, hail and lightning, are not simulated in climate models.

#### *El Niño*

- Confidence in projections of changes in future frequency, amplitude, and spatial pattern of El Niño events in the tropical Pacific is tempered by some shortcomings in how well El Niño is simulated in complex models. Current projections show little change or a small increase in amplitude for El Niño events over the next 100 years.
- Even with little or no change in El Niño amplitude, global warming is likely to lead to greater extremes of drying and heavy rainfall and increase the risk of droughts and floods that occur with El Niño events in many different regions.

*Monsoons*

- It is likely that warming associated with increasing greenhouse gas concentrations will cause an increase of Asian summer monsoon precipitation variability. Changes in monsoon mean duration and strength depend on the details of the emission scenario. The confidence in such projections is also limited by how well the climate models simulate the detailed seasonal evolution of the monsoons.

*Thermohaline circulation*

- Most models show weakening of the ocean thermohaline circulation which leads to a reduction of the heat transport into high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. However, even in models where the thermohaline circulation weakens, there is still a warming over Europe due to increased greenhouse gases. The current projections using climate models do not exhibit a complete shut down of the thermohaline circulation by 2100. Beyond 2100, the thermohaline circulation could completely, and possibly irreversibly, shut down in either hemisphere if the change in radiative forcing is large enough and applied long enough.

*Snow and Ice*

- Northern Hemisphere snow cover and sea-ice extent are projected to decrease further.
- Glaciers and icecaps are projected to continue their widespread retreat during the 21st century.
- The Antarctic ice sheet is likely to gain mass because of greater precipitation, while the Greenland ice sheet is likely to lose mass because the increase in runoff will exceed the precipitation increase.
- Concerns have been expressed about the stability of the West Antarctic ice sheet because it is grounded below sea level. However, loss of grounded ice leading to substantial sea level rise from this source is now widely agreed to be very unlikely during the 21st century, although its dynamics are still inadequately understood, especially for projections on longer time scales.

*Sea Level*

- Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 metres between 1990 and 2100, for the full range of SRES scenarios. This is due primarily to thermal expansion and loss of mass from glaciers and ice caps (Figure 5(e)). The range of sea level rise presented in the SAR was 0.13 to 0.94 metres based on the IS92 scenarios. Despite the higher temperature change projections in this assessment, the sea level projections are slightly lower, primarily due to the use of improved models, which give a smaller contribution from glaciers and ice sheets.

**Anthropogenic climate change will persist for many centuries.**

- Emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases (i.e. CO<sub>2</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>) have a lasting effect on atmospheric composition, radiative forcing and climate. For example, several centuries after CO<sub>2</sub> emissions occur, about a quarter of the increase in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration caused by these emissions is still present in the atmosphere.
- After greenhouse gas concentrations have stabilised, global average surface temperatures would rise at a rate of only a few tenths of a degree per century rather than several degrees per century as projected for the 21st century without stabilisation. The lower the level at which concentrations are stabilised, the smaller the total temperature change.
- Global mean surface temperature increases and rising sea level from thermal expansion of the ocean are projected to continue for hundreds of years after stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations (even at present levels), owing to the long timescales on which the deep ocean adjusts to climate change.
- Ice sheets will continue to react to climate warming and contribute to sea level rise for thousands of years after climate has been stabilized. Climate models indicate that the local warming over Greenland is likely to be 1 to 3 times the global average. Ice sheet models project that a local warming of larger than 3°C, if sustained for millennia,